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A Critical Research Agenda for Wills, Trusts and Estates 
 
By Bridget J. Crawford∗ and Anthony C. Infanti± 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The law of wills, trusts, and estates could benefit from 
consideration of its development and impact on people of color; 
women of all colors; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered 
individuals; low-income and poor individuals; the disabled; and 
nontraditional families.  One can measure the law’s commitment to 
justice and equality by understanding the impact on these 
historically disempowered groups of the laws of intestacy, spousal 
rights, child protection, will formalities, will contests, and will 
construction; the creation, operation and construction of trusts; 
fiduciary administration; creditors’ rights; asset protection; 
nonprobate transfers; planning for incapacity and death; and 
wealth transfer taxation. This essay reviews examples of what the 
authors call “critical trusts and estates scholarship” and identifies 
additional avenues of inquiry that might be fruitfully pursued by 
other scholars who are interested in bringing an “outsider” 
perspective to their work in this area. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A parent may be critical of a teenager’s revealing outfit.  A novel 
may experience critical success.  The bookstore may carry a critical 
edition of Shakespeare’s sonnets.  A particular task may be critical to a 
mission.  The word “critical” has multiple meanings.  As we consider the 
outlines of a “critical” research agenda for wills, trusts and estates, it is 
important to clarify what we mean by the term.  If one understands 
“critical” to mean judgmental, often in a negative sense, then a critical 
research agenda may be nothing special.  After all, a legal scholar’s stock 
in trade is identifying a particular law’s shortcomings and proposing 
remedies to cure its defects.  Similarly if “critical” refers to the judgment 
of a group of evaluators, any trusts and estates scholarship might meet 
critical acclaim, garner mixed reviews, or face critical oblivion when it is 
ignored altogether.  Or, a “critical” collection of scholarship might be akin 
to an anthology or compilation of all important academic work on a 
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particular subtopic within the trusts and estates field; that is, the 
scholarship could be critical in the sense that it is necessary or key to 
understanding a field. 
 
 None of these meanings is what we have in mind when we talk 
about a “critical” research agenda for trusts and estates.  For us, critical 
scholarship uses an “outsider” perspective as a lens to examine the 
substance and structure of the law. This means more than just making the 
obligatory passing reference to race, class, gender, or sexual orientation in 
a law review article. It means examining why the law has developed the 
way it has and considering what impact the law has on historically 
disempowered groups such as people of color; women of all colors; 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individuals; low-income and 
poor individuals; the disabled; and nontraditional families.  
 
 In the allied area of taxation, a small but steady stream of 
scholarship has emerged over the past two decades.  Taken together, this 
work constitutes the incipient body critical tax scholarship. Both of us 
self-identify as members of this “movement.” We contend that scholarship 
in the area of the law of wills, trusts, and estates could benefit from similar 
consideration of the structure and operation of the laws of intestacy, 
spousal rights, child protection, will formalities, will contests, and will 
construction; the creation, operation and construction of trusts; fiduciary 
administration; creditors’ rights; asset protection; nonprobate transfers; 
planning for incapacity and death; and wealth transfer taxation. In each of 
these areas, it is important to interrogate how and why the law operates to 
privilege certain kind of people, property, families and transfers.   
 
 One might naturally ask why being critical is important in these 
two “money” areas of the law. It is important because “the suppression of 
economic personality is intricately connected to the denial of political 
personality and citizenship.  In fact, economic discrimination may be 
viewed as a key manifestation of political marginalization and social 
subordination.”1  In other words, understanding (1) how “money law” 
operates to benefit certain groups and (2) who those groups are helps to 
reveal structural barriers to economic flourishing and to expose inequality.  
Inequality in the economic realm often tracks social and political 
inequality as well. 
 
 This essay provides samples of scholarship that fall loosely in the 
category of what we call “critical” trusts and estates scholarship. Not all of 
the authors teach primarily in the trusts and estates area, or even in law 
schools at all.  We do not include here the “best” scholarship, but rather a 
sample of what we found interesting.  The work for all of us is to discover 
                                                
1 Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective 51 
STAN. L. REV. 221, 283 (1999). 
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and write more of it. To that end, we point out in each of the areas covered 
in this essay several topics left uncovered and questions that remain to be 
answered in the hope that others will take up the challenge of adding to 
this burgeoning literature. 
 
I.  RACE 
 
 Race is central to the story of American property law.  Native 
Americans lived on land later claimed by colonists and settlers in the name 
of European monarchs.2  Through a series of sales3 and then treaties4 -- 
many of which came to be criticized as greatly disadvantageous to the 
Native Americans5 -- European governments took title to land in the area 
now known as the eastern United States.  Settlers received land grants 
from the crown and then established homes, businesses and agrarian 
operations,6 many of which benefitted from the labor of enslaved Native 
Americans and then enslaved Africans.7  The laws of some colonies 
codified the status of slaves as property, not persons, beginning as early as 
1669.8  Slavery developed into a widespread, brutal and exploitative 
                                                
2 See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 12-16 (1980) 
(describing pattern of violent capitalistic interactions between Indians and English 
settlers); WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE 
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (2011) (colonists’ changes to land and environment).   
3 The most famous of these is perhaps the sale of Manhattan for an alleged twenty-four 
dollars.  See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 259 
(1965) (“In 1626, Peter Minuet, in charge of the Dutch settlement on Manhattan Island, 
paid the Indians sixty gulden for that twenty-thousand acre tract of woodland.”) 
4 See, e.g., John R. Wunder, “Merciless Indian Savages” and the Declaration of 
Independence: Native Americans Translate the Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 65, 72 (“Between 1777 and 1785, the states of South Carolina, Georgia, 
North Carolina, and Virginia forced the Cherokees to cede nearly 10,000 acres.”). 
5 Otoe & Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265, 276-277 (Ct. Cl.) 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955) (noting that legislative history of Indian Claims 
Commission Act reflected Congress desire to create remedy in cases “where the 
Government's dealings with Indians concerning that same property right were less than 
fair and honorable,” inter alia) . 
6 See David A. Thomas, Why the Public Plundering of Private Property is Still a Very 
Bad Idea, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 25, 51 (2006) (in seventeenth century Virginia, 
“by several devices the vast lands of tidewater Virginia began to shift into private 
ownership. Farmers completing their tenancies might be in position to buy land outright. 
Settlers could receive land for their work, and if they properly exploited their first grant, 
they could receive a second grant of equal size without further investment. Likewise, 
investors received grants in recognition of their stock, with further grants to follow if the 
first were profitably developed.”).  
7 Laurence Armand French, Native American Reparations: Five Hundred Years and 
Counting, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND 
REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 241, 242 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) (Indian slavery 
was “not unusual” in certain colonies) 
8 See Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property? in THE LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY FROM HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY (Jean Allain 
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institution in the colonies and then the United States.9 The institution 
denied slaves basic human dignities and treated slaves as legal objects, not 
legal subjects.10 
 
 The obvious intersections of race, property and testation have been 
rich inspiration for the work of historians and legal scholars alike.11  
Stephen Duane Davis II and Alfred L. Brophy provide an example of 
empirical research in their study of 110 wills probated in Greene County, 
Alabama from 1831 to 1835 and 1841 to 1845. 12  The testators they 
studied were primarily wealthy men who left their property to family 
members, often through sophisticated trusts.  Davis and Brophy look in 
particular at testators who attempted testamentary manumission of their 
slaves and the legal constraints in Alabama against doing so.  Davis and 
Brophy are careful to identify the limitations of their research, listing the 
both the qualitative questions that their research did not answer and 
inviting further comparative empirical study of wills probated in other 
Alabama counties. 
 
 Adrienne D. Davis does a close reading of several probate cases in 
her exploration, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum 
Perspective.13  In this article, Professor Davis studies a series of judicial 
decisions involving testamentary transfers by men, mostly white, to 
women who were former slaves and with whom the testator had a sexual 
relationship.14  Many of the women in the cases shared children with the 
testator. Professor Davis is interested in sorting through “those sexual or 
                                                                                                                     
ed. 2012), 105-134, 113-114 (describing Virginia law of 1669 providing for immunity for 
slave owners who caused death when punishing own slaves). 
9 See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY 
IN THE NEW WORLD (2006). 
10 See, e.g., M. Eugene Sirmans, The Legal Status of the Slave in South Carolina, 1670-
1740, 28 J. S. HIST. 462 (1962) (slaves treated as legal chattel). 
11 See, e.g., WE ARE YOUR SISTERS: BLACK WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(Dorothy Sterling ed. 1984) (identifying 100 wills in which white men transferred 
property by will to black women); CAROLE SHAMMAS, MARYLYNN SLAMON & MICHEL 
DAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES UNTIL THE PRESENT (1987); 
HENDRIK A. HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE 
AND OLD AGE (2012). 
12 The Davis-Brophy study is modeled after a similar study conducted in San Bernadino 
County, California by Stanford Law Professor Lawrence M. Friedman and his co-authors.  
See Lawrence M. Friedman, et al., The Inheritance Process in San Bernardino, 
California, 1964: A Research Note, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1445 (2007).   
13 Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective 51 
STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999). 
14 Professor Davis explains her rejection of terms like “mistress,” “lover,” or “partner,” 
among others, to describe these relationships: “Many phrases which appear descriptive, 
or which I might use as terms of art, carry too much social baggage to be 
helpful….[M]ost of these terms cannot account for the complexity of nineteenth century 
male sexual power combined with race and status differences.”  Id. at n.17. 
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biological relationships that yield legal obligations and entitlements and 
those that do not,”15 and the way that race factors into the determination.  
She discusses the case of Jolliffe v. Fanning & Phillips,16 in which the 
nominated executors under one will sought to set aside a subsequently-
executed will in which the white testator freed his concubine and their 
shared children and directed the liquidation of his estate for their benefit.  
The concubine and children were located in Ohio, but the testator’s will 
was probated in South Carolina, his presumed domicile. South Carolina 
law prohibited testamentary manumission of slaves.  The court upheld the 
disposition in favor of the concubine and the shared children on the 
grounds that they had been freed during the testator’s lifetime (and thus 
the attempted testamentary manumission was invalid, but the validity of 
the will itself was undisturbed).  While noting the positive outcome for the 
testator’s intended beneficiaries, Professor Davis examines a tension in the 
court’s rhetoric between deference to testamentary freedom and overt 
disapproval of the testator’s private sexual choices.17  The article explains 
how the law confronted these conflicts between “the ideologies of 
property and race,” along with other conflicting ideologies of “race, 
sexuality and gender roles.”18  
 
 Another example of an historical exploration of testation and race 
is Kevin Noble Maillard’s The Color of Testamentary Freedom.19 In that 
article, Professor Maillard raises questions about the role of race in courts’ 
willingness to uphold donative transfers.  He uses as his focal point two 
will contests involving the family of Paul Remley of Charleston, South 
Carolina. The elder Mr. Remley left property to his wife and appointed his 
son Paul Durbin Remley as administrator.  A collateral relative stepped 
forward to assert that Mr. Remley’s widow was a slave, and as such, the 
bequest to her was invalid and Paul Durbin Remley was ineligible to serve 
as administrator.20 This claim was defeated upon community testimony 
that the widow was treated by her church and other neighbors as white.21  
Mr. Remley’s will was upheld only after a judicial showing of the 
whiteness of his wife, and thus, their children. 
 
 When Mr. Remley’s son, Paul Durbin Remley, died three years 
after his father, he left his estate in trust for the benefit a slave, with whom 
                                                
15 Id. at 225. 
16 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 186 (1856). 
17 Davis, supra note 13, at 256 (the court’s opinion “gave legal force to Willis’ [the 
testator’s] impulse to provide for his black family, even as it strongly condemned the 
conduct that motivated him”). 
18 Id. at 286. 
19 Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 SMU L. REV. 1783 
(2009). 
20 Id. at 1797-1798. 
21 Id. 
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he fathered to children, and their mixed-race children.  Remley’s siblings, 
whose white racial identity had been challenged in the earlier will contest, 
then stepped forward to contest the validity of the younger Remley’s 
bequest for the benefit of his slave family. At the time, South Carolina law 
prohibited bequests to slaves.22 The case was settled after the enactment of 
the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery, and the amount of the 
testamentary trust was sharply reduced.23  Professor Maillard argues that 
this case illustrates that the court “and collateral heirs ignore testamentary 
language to reformulate a will to more closely conform to state-mandated 
schemes of distribution.”24  In other words, race had everything to do with 
how both generation of Remley family wills were interpreted. 
 
 The historical experience of slavery and the law of succession give 
rise to a contemporary problem in modern-day South Carolina, as 
explored by Professor Faith Rivers in her work on African-American 
“heirs’ property” in the Lowcountry of South Carolina.  Her article 
Inequity in Equity: The Tragedy of Tenancy in Common for Heirs’ 
Property Owners Facing Partition in Equity25 explains South Carolina’s 
experience of post-Civil War land distribution.  Although the South 
Carolina Land Commission was poorly managed and ultimately benefitted 
more whites than blacks, these sales, combined with private transactions 
and federal sales, enabled 16,000 African-Americans to acquire 50,000 
acres, mostly in South Carolina’s Lowcountry.26  As Professor Rivers 
explains, however, a variety of factors -- including low numbers of 
African-American lawyers, general distrust of private attorneys, and high 
costs -- kept many Lowcountry landowners from turning to lawyers for 
advice on property-related issues, such as succession.27  Without a will, 
the law of intestacy governs the disposition of a decedent’s property, 
resulting in fractionalization of property interests when, for example, a 
landowner who is survived by five children and no spouse, each child will 
take a one-fifth interest in the property as tenants in common.  Practically 
speaking, over generations, property ownership becomes increasingly 
fractionalized. A single parcel of property may be owned by hundreds of 
family members, some of whom are only distantly related, and may not 
know each other at all.28 
                                                
22 Id. at n.127 (Act to Prevent the Emancipation of Slaves, and for Other Purposes (1841) 
(citations omitted). 
23 Maillard, supra note 19, at 1809. 
24 Maillard, supra note 19, at 1804. 
25 Faith Rivers, Inequity in Equity: The Tragedy of Tenancy in Common for Heirs’ 
Property Owners Facing Partition in Equity, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2007-
2008). 
26 Id. at 25.   
27 Id. at 26-28 
28 “[T]he entire class of heirs’ property owners -- ranging from small, nuclear families of 
siblings who inherit property from the original purchasers, to hundreds of cousins and 
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 Separate from property management concerns, tenancy in common 
gives rise to the possibility of a forced partition by sale.  Legally speaking, 
if the tenants in common cannot agree on how the property should be 
used, the appropriate legal remedy is partition.  Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the partition may be in kind, i.e., division of the property into 
individually-owned interests representing each owner’s fractional interest 
in the whole,29 or by sale and division of the proceeds.  Using cases from 
the nineteenth century, Professor Rivers reveals that South Carolina’s 
partition doctrine has roots in the system of slavery, as partition (by sale) 
was the remedy developed by courts in cases where human beings 
regarded by law as property, or slaves, comprised part of a decedent’s 
estate.30  Because South Carolina’s doctrine is partition by sale, then all it 
takes in contemporary South Carolina Lowcountry is one disgruntled co-
owner -- or perhaps one approached by an unscrupulous developer -- to 
force other owners of to sell.  Professor Rivers is concerned that owners of 
“heirs’ property,” as this fractionated Lowcountry property is called, could 
be subject to pressures from developers to sell their land, thus suffering 
the fate of Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, which used to have a 
population that was 90% black and was less than 15% black in 1975.31 
 
 In considering how to stem the possible erosion of black-owned 
property, Professor Rivers notes with approval other jurisdictions’ 
experience with partition in-kind and rules that would grant a right of first 
refusal of sorts to co-owners,32 as well as other states’ more protective 
procedural rules for partition.33 
 
 Professor Rivers’ work builds on an earlier article, Through a 
Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial Partition, Family Land Loss, 
and Rule Setting,34 by Phyllis Craig-Taylor.  Professor Craig-Taylor  
provides a thorough history and overview of the development of the 
American law of partition and offers a biting critique of the 
“inconsistencies and potential unfairness” produced in most cases 
involving a sale of property after judicial partition.35  Professor Craig-
Taylor argues that African-Americans have been disproportionately 
                                                                                                                     
relatives who inherited property over the course of 150 years -- are left to ‘work out 
among themselves’ how property will be managed.” Id. at 51 (citation omitted). 
29 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), partition. 
30 Rivers, supra note 25, 39-40. 
31 Id. at 30. 
32 Id. at 69-71. 
33 Id. at 74-75. 
34 Phyllis Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial Partition, 
Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 737 (2000). 
35 Id. at 759. 
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affected by the judicial partition cases, because are more likely than whites 
to inherit property via intestacy, and thus own fractionated interests in 
land.36  She also claims that the history of African-Americans in this 
country causes them to value land ownership more than other types of 
asset ownership,37 and as such, land ownership is a sort of cultural 
patrimony being destroyed by judicial partition.  Professor Craig-Smith 
proposes modification of partition laws to make it more difficult to force 
the sale of property owned as tenants in common, as well as a generous 
“redemption period,” in which non-selling family members would have 
the right to buy the property from those wishing to force the sale.38 
 
 Palma Joy Strand provides a contemporary perspective on race and 
inheritance in her article Inheriting Inequality: Weath, Race, and the Laws 
of Succession.39  Strand is concerned with the ways that inheritance 
perpetuates wealth disparities between black and white households.  She 
presents data about overallwealth inequality in the United States, and 
examines wealth disparities among whites and among blacks. She finds a 
more significant intra-racial disparity among blacks than among whites.40  
Strand observes that comparatively fewer blacks than whites receive 
inheritances.41 She claims that racial wealth disparities are “today’s 
version of yesterday’s segregation and the slavery of the day before,”42 or, 
in other words, the present-day consequences of past de facto and de jure 
discrimination.  To remedy racial disparities, Strand suggests treating 
gifts, bequests, devises and inheritances as income.43  She also notes 
problems that arise with “heirs’ property,” as Faith Rivers does in her 
study of South Carolina.44  Strand explains how the failure to probate an 
estate and clear title to what may be the family’s largest asset -- the home -
- wealth can erode in a matter of one or two generations.  Strand proposes 
reforming the intestacy statute to eliminate fractionated ownership of 
small estates consisting of a family home and to simplify transfer of title at 
death.45  This portion of Strand’s investigation might provide the fruitful 
                                                
36 Id. at 737 (“African Americans tend not to engage in estate planning; thus 
disproportionately, their real property passes under the laws of intestacy, making t more 
likely for property to be owned under the co-ownership forms that are subject to 
partition.”) (citations omitted). 
37 Id. at 737 (“cultural and sociological studies suggest that African Americans value land 
ownership beyond the market value that the relevant land commands”). 
38 Craig-Taylor, supra note 34, at 780-785. 
39 Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 
OR. L. REV. 453 (2010-2011). 
40 Id. at 462-463. 
41 Id. at 467. 
42 Id. at 377 (emphasis in the original). 
43 Strand, supra note 39, at 485. 
44 See supra notes __ to ___. 
45 Strand, supra note 39, at 501. 
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basis for additional scholarship, in an effort to create sensible rules that are 
easy to administer and ones that do justice. 
 
 Most of the scholarship involving race and testation tends to be 
historical.  The relative availability of formal court records make wills 
particularly ripe for empirical and qualitative studies.  To be sure, much 
work remains to be done to reveal how testators in different parts of the 
country historically have disposed of their property and how past socio-
legal and political events caused patterns of testation to change.  Formal 
legal documents such as wills and trusts can reveal a wealth of information 
about the racial attitudes and hierarchies of previous generations.  Existing 
scholarship focuses on slavery in the American South.  Scholars might 
choose to explore historic wills in the Midwest or West, areas with 
different historic experiences of racial inclusion and exclusion.  Stories of  
patterns of testation and property ownership among people of Chinese, 
Japanese and Mexican ancestry, among others, are waiting to be told.  
 
 Contemporary wills practice, particularly as it relates to race, is 
another wide-open scholarly ground waiting to be occupied.  Cross-racial 
studies of wealth accumulation and transmission could effectively move 
scholarship in this area out of a black-white binary to reveal more nuanced 
understandings of different attitudes and behaviors concerning wealth and 
inheritance.  There appears to be no substantial legal scholarship 
addressing contemporary Asian-American, Latino or Native American 
testation. 
 
 Robust critical scholarship in the area of wills, trusts and estates 
might fruitfully begin to look behind the study of wills themselves to 
intersections of race with other areas.  For example, consider patterns and 
practices of planning for incapacity and death.  Are some racial groups 
more likely to execute living wills and health care proxies?  If so, why is 
this the case?  What cultural factors might influence those practices?  On 
the subject of trusts, scholars might look at the extent to which charitable 
giving, particularly in the form of trusts, has been used to replicate or 
disrupt racial hierarchies.  A worthwhile scholarly project might be 
mapping judicial responses to them in different historical and 
contemporary contexts.  A variety of “Indian funds” are held by the 
federal government,46 and academic inquiry of the operation of these trusts 
could fruitfully illuminate issues of self-determination and ownership that 
are of great importance to Native Americans. There is so much more to 
discover about the intersections of race with wills, trusts and estates. 
 
                                                
46 See, e.g., American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-412, 108 Stat. 4293 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 4001-61(2012)). 
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II. GENDER 
 
 Scholarship in the area of wills, trusts and estates that is concerned 
with gender tends to address one of three questions: (1) How are women’s 
wills different than men’s wills? (2) How does the probate process or the 
substance of wills that have been probated implicate questions of gender? 
(3) How does gender inform attitudes toward estate planning?  
 
A. Women’s and Men’s Wills 
 
 An excellent example of scholarship in this first category is 
Kristine Knapulund’s article The Evolution of Women’s Rights in 
Inheritance.47  Knaplund made a detailed study of 246 probate files from 
Los Angeles County, California in 1893.48  She locates her work in the 
larger historical context of the 1861 California Married Womens’ Property 
Act which allowed women to manage and control their separate property 
and subsequent legislative changes enacted in 1872 that gave women full 
control over their separate property.49  Knaplund found that a substantial 
number of women executed wills (29% of testate decedents were 
women)50, that women were more likely than men to leave their property 
to children or family members than to a surviving spouse,51 and that 
property left to women typically passed outright, and not in trust.52  
Professor Knaplund’s archive-based methodology is consistent with the 
same empirical tradition that informed earlier studies by Steven Duane 
Davis II and Alfred L. Brophy,53 among others.54  Knaplund’s work 
enhances understanding of “women as an economic force in California” in 
                                                
47 Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women's Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS 
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (2008). 
48 Id. at 5-6. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at Figure 6. 
51 Id. at 39. 
52 Knaplund, supra note 47, at 39. 
53 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
54 Knaplund cites to seven other empirical studies of wills with “comparable 
methodology” to the one deployed in her project: Steuart Henderson Britt, The 
Significance of the Last Will and Testament, 8 J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (1937); Allison 
Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 241 (1962-63); Lawrence M. Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th 
Century: A Study of Essex County (New Jersey) Wills, 8 AM. J. OF LEGL HIST. 24 (1964); 
Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans’ Dispositive Preferences with 
Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1941 
(1977-78); Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United 
States and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303 (1968-69); Edward J. Ward and J.J. 
Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 393 (1950). See also 
Davis and Brophy, supra note ___. 
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the nineteenth century and draws attention to the ways that women’s wills 
tended to be different than men’s wills. 
 
 Daphna Hacker provides an overview of extant empirical 
scholarship on wills The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical 
Food for Legal Thought.55  Professor Hacker provides a narrative review 
of 23 studies that bear in some way on issues of gender and inheritance. In 
Western societies and in Israel she finds, women “enjoy privilege, power, 
and control” in the realm of testation, as women execute wills at 
approximately the same rate, or even at higher rates, than men do.56  
Professor Hacker reports that testate men tend to leave their property 
entirely to the surviving spouse, whereas women tend to have a broader 
range of heirs, including children.57 
 
 Alyssa DiRusso considers the extent to which gender influences 
the language that male and female testators use in He Says, She Asks: 
Gender, Language, and the Law of Precatory Words in Wills.58  Professor 
DiRusso surveyed 324 individuals about their preferred wording for 
certain will provisions.  She found that “women were more likey to use 
precatory language than men and people who intended to grant discretion 
to their executors were more likely to use precatory language than those 
who intended to bind their executors.”59  Thus, she concludes that courts 
“must give greater credence to ascertaining the intended meaning of the 
language the testator chose,”60 instead of employing bright-line tests that 
would treat certain words as always binding and others as always 
precatory.  Professor DiRusso acknowledges that her findings might be 
complicated by the involvement of attorneys in the drafting process, but 
notes that a large percentage of all wills are drafted without attorneys.61  
She does not specify how the availability of computerized will programs 
or even legal forms might complicate the analysis, but her basic thesis is 
clear: for reasons of biology or culture, men and women might use 
different words, and the search for testamentary intent should be informed 
by a gender-sensitive understanding of how men and women may 
communicate differently.  
 
                                                
55 Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal 
Thought, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 322 (2010). 
56 Id. at 350, 331-334 
57 Id. at 335. 
58 Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of Precatory 
Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2007). 
59 Id. at 46. 
60 Id. at 49. 
61 Id. at 47. 
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B. Probate Courts, Probated Wills, Women and Men 
 
 Donative intent is not the only principle which guides a court’s 
interpretation of a will.  As Professor Melanie Leslie has observed, many 
courts use malleable doctrines such as undue influence in order to impose 
“a duty to provide for those whom the court views has having a superior 
moral claim to the testator’s assets, usually a financially dependent spouse 
or persons related by blood to the testator.”62  In other words, where a 
testator deviates too far from majoritarian norms for the disposition of his 
or her property, a court may set aside those dispositions. In a student note 
published in 1997, Brian Alan Ross explores how the doctrine of undue 
influence is permeated with gender stereotypes in Undue Influence and 
Gender Inequity.63  He examines several cases in which a contestant 
alleges the existence of a “meretricious relationship” that caused the 
testator’s free will to be so overcome that the testator made a disposition 
that he or she would not have made otherwise.64  Ross closely reads a 
series of cases and concludes that “courts often apply the undue influence 
doctrine in a way that strongly pressures women to conform to traditional 
gender roles, by mischaracterizing them and in some instances stripping 
them of their testamentary privileges if they challenge various ideals of 
femininity, monogamy and marriage.”65  Decisions involving older 
women with younger men portray the older women as “worthless and 
submissive,” having personal preferences that easily overcome, whereas 
young women with older men are portrayed as “the cunning temptress.”66  
Scholars have paid increasing attention in recent years to the doctrine of 
undue influence, exploring how dominant cultural norms inform how 
judges and juries evaluate claims of undue influence.67  Gender and 
sexuality have informed several of these analyses, but much there is 
continued room for additional scholarship in this area, along with allied 
investigations into claims of fraud in the inducement to execute a will and 
claims of tortuous interference. 
 
                                                
62 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996). 
63 Brian Alan Ross, Undue Influence and Gender Inequity, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 97 
(1997). 
64 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.3(b) cmt. 
e (2003) (“A donative transfer is procured by undue influence if the influence exerted 
over the donor overcame the donor’s free will and caused the donor to make a donative 
transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.”). 
65 Id. at 100. 
66 Id. at 115. 
67 See, e.g., Carla Spivack, Why the Testmentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should be 
Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245 (2010); E Gary Spiko, Gone but not Conforming: 
Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cutlural Norms Through Minority-
Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1999); Ray Madoff, Unmasking 
Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997).  See also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue 
Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U PITT. L. REV. 225 (1981). 
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 Not precisely under the heading of “probate courts treating men 
and women differently,” but relating the broad questions of inheritance is 
Professor Carla Spivack’s work considers whether some heirs should be 
deemed to be “unworthy” to inherit.  Professor Spivack takes up that 
question in the context of battering spouses.68 She proposes a “complete 
ban” on inheritance of both probate and non-probate property by abusing 
spouses.69  Professor Spivack’s scholarship creatively considers how a 
comprehensive campaign against domestic violence implicates the 
substantive law of wills and trusts.  In that sense, it is a model of 
scholarship that explores how an issue of traditional concern for feminist 
scholars -- in this case, domestic violence -- might have implications for a 
seemingly unrelated area of inheritance and property. 
 
 Daphna Hacker’s review of empirical studies of inheritance reports 
on the discrimination that female heirs experience in Tanzania70 and South 
Asia,71 for example. In most Westerns societies, in contrast, most parents 
“treat their offspring equally regardless of sex,” she reports, but certain 
property like jewelry typically passes to daughters and farms and 
businesses typically pass to sons.72  It appears that in Western and Israeli 
societies, women are more likely or equally likely to contest a will, but 
that wills benefitting women are more likely to be contested than those 
benefitting men.73 
   
 Mary Louise Fellows looks at the substance of testamentary trusts 
in Wills and Trusts: “The Kingdom of the Fathers.”74  Professor Fellows 
exposes the qualified terminable interest property (or “QTIP”) trust as 
evidence of “the patriarchy’s subversion of women’s property rights,”75 in 
that (typically male) testators could qualify for a 100% estate tax marital 
deduction even though they left their (female) surviving spouses only an 
income interest in a trust over which the surviving spouse had no power of 
appointment.  Professor Wendy Gerzog expanded this critique in her 
article The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading 
                                                
68 Carla Spivack, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance, 90 OR. L. 
REV. 247 (2011) 
69 Id. at 248-249. 
70 Hacker, supra note 55, at 336-337. 
71 Id. at 337. 
72 Id. at 337-338. 
73 Id. at 344. 
74 Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: The Kingdom of the Fathers, 10 LAW & INEQ. 
137 (1991). 
75 Id. at 158. 
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to Women.76  Professor Gerzog sees the QTIP as evidence of “clear gender 
bias and stereotyping,”77 and calls for their abolition. 
 
C. Estate Planning 
 
 In “Where There’s a Will, There’s a Woman”: Exploring the 
Gendered Nature of Will Making,78 Ezra Hasson considers gender issues 
in the estate planning context.  He conducted interviews with 26 estate 
planners in the East Midlands area of England; the practitioners served 
clients from diverse social classes.  Hasson’s interviews revealed that 
women were more likely than men to initiate estate planning process79 and 
that women tend to “dominate practitioner-cleint meetings.80 Hasson 
hypothesizes that women’s seeming greater involvement in the process is 
extension of their mothering role (i.e., involving caring for and managing 
the fiscal health of the family, as well as securing the children’s future), as 
well as self-interested, as women tend to outlive their male partners.81  
Hasson’s conclusions are the practitioners might effectively target their 
services toward women82 and that the government needs to do more to 
increase public awareness in general of the importance of having a will.83 
 
D. Additional Avenues of Inquiry 
 
 While it may be true that the law of inheritance is, as Daphna 
Hacker claims, “one of the most impressive achievements of liberal 
feminism,”84 there is much scholars do not know about how gender is at 
play in the operation of the law of wills, trusts, and estates.  Apart from the 
QTIP trust, feminist scholars have not devoted substantial scholarly 
attention to the operation of trusts.  In what ways might trusts operate to 
perpetuate women’s financial dependence on men? To what extent do 
trusts limit women’s control over money that arguably belongs in part to 
them, if accumulated during a long-term marriage?   
 
 A scholar interested in different attitudes and behaviors of men and 
women might consider gender differences in attitudes about investment, 
                                                
76 Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading 
to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301 (1995). 
77 Id. at 322. 
78 Ezra Hasson, “Where There’s a Will, There’s a Woman”: Exploring the Gendered 
Nature of Will Making, 21 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 21 (2013). 
79 Id. at 25. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 33-34. 
82 Id. at 35. 
83 Hasson, supra note 78, at 35. 
84 Hacker, supra note 55, at 350. 
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and how different tolerances for risk may bear on the fiduciary standard 
(first the “Prudent Man” rule85 and now the “Prudent Investor” rule86) to 
which fiduciaries are held.  Also, are there any differences in how men 
and women use the money they inherit?87  We know very little about what 
people do with assets they have acquired from previous generations.   
 
 The practical impact of legal reform on how men and women 
organize their finances is another field of investigation.  Four areas come 
to mind.  First, self-settled asset protection trusts are twentieth century 
innovation about which little is known.  Who creates these trusts and have 
they changed the divorce landscape in any way?  Second, elective 
community property regimes have been enacted in two jurisdictions, 
Alaska88 and Tennessee.89  How couples have chosen to avail themselves 
of these arrangements, and what are their motivations for doing so?   
Third, the enactment of estate tax portability has limited the financial 
incentives to equalize a husband’s and wife’s estate during their 
lifetimes.90  How has the structure of the tax system changed the way that 
husbands and wives organize their finances?  Finally, what do we know 
about gendered dimensions of perpetual trusts?  Who creates them and for 
what purposes?  Are perpetual trusts the ultimate manifestation of 
patriarchal control, or can they be read in a more feminist light?  
 
 The legal profession itself should not escape critical study.  To 
what extent have women advanced to leadership positions in the Trusts & 
Estates bar at a rate that is faster, slower or comparable to other specialty 
areas?  How has the field of Trusts & Estates been more or less 
accommodating to female attorneys, and what changes might one expect 
to see?  In recent memory, the reporters for Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, and the 
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.  The reporter Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act (1994) and most Uniform Law Commissioners have 
been men.  How might the lack of gender diversity impact the “top down” 
                                                
85 See, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of 
Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 
J.L. & ECON 681 (2007). 
86 Unif. Prudent Investor Act (1994) 
87 Daphna Hacker notes only one study that addresses this issue.  See 
Hacker, supra note 55, at 345 (referring to JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, 
INHERITANCE AND FAMILIES (1996). 
88 See Alaska Stat. § 34.77.100 to .160 (2013). 
89 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-17-101 to -108 (2013). 
90 See [insert cite]. 
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reforms?91  And of the important “bottom up” reforms coming from 
practitioners,92 what has been women’s involvement?  Anectodal evidence 
suggests that women’s participation has been almost non-existent.  What 
does that say about women’s role in the Trusts & Estates bar?  The legal 
profession itself?  Perhaps we should not be too quick to praise the 
“achievements of liberal feminism” in the area of inheritance law.93 
 
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
 
 Prior to the advent of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts,94 there 
was a burgeoning literature on the heteronormativity of state intestacy 
laws. In The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of 
Non-Marital Inclusion, Professor Gary Spitko examined article II of the 
Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which addresses intestate succession, and 
identified seven different values that underpin that portion of the UPC.95 
As Professor Spitko identified these values, he analyzed whether the 
refusal to recognize committed same-sex relationships under article II is 
consistent with the values underpinning it.96 Ultimately, Professor Spitko 
concluded that it is inconsistent with the values underpinning article II to 
exclude committed same-sex couples from the default protections 
embodied in intestacy laws.97 Professor Spitko suggested that the drafters 
of the UPC could take account of committed same-sex relationships in 
article II through a combination of reliance upon a domestic partner 
registration system and a “multi-factor approach that limits judicial 
discretion through objective requirements and clearly delineated factors 
for qualification or a combination of these two systems.”98 
 
 Against this background, Professor Spitko considered the 
expressive function of succession laws, as “intestacy law not only reflects 
society’s familial norms but also helps to shape and maintain them.”99  
Professor Spitko considered ways in which the drafters of the UPC could 
take account of committed same-sex relationships while still threading 
                                                
91 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule 
and Trust Asset Allocation: An Emprical Analysis, 35 ACTEC 314, 314, 
318 (2010). 
92 Id. 
93 Supra note 84. 
94 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
95 E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-
Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1067–99 (1999). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1099. 
98 Id. at 1107. 
99 Id. at 1100. 
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their way between the opposing sides in the ongoing culture war over the 
expressive function of the law in affirming or stigmatizing same-sex 
relationships.100 Though allowing for the possibility that the drafters might 
wish to stay out of these battles, Professor Spitko concluded that avoiding 
even an acknowledgment of committed same-sex relationships itself 
constitutes taking a side, and explained that, whichever side the drafters 
ultimately take, acknowledging committed same-sex relationships would 
be a step forward.101 
 
 Similarly, in Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement 
for Same-Sex Equality, Professor Tom Gallanis argued that the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights movement needs to fight to 
change not only mandatory rules (e.g., prohibitions against same-sex 
marriage or limiting the categories of individuals who may adopt) but also 
the often overlooked default rules that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation.102 As an example of a set of default rules that discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation, Professor Gallanis analyzed the impact of 
laws governing intestate succession, healthcare decision making, and 
guardianship on members of the LGBT community.103 Professor Gallanis 
advocated the undertaking of empirical research to determine which 
default rules the LGBT community would generally prefer and considered 
some of the difficulties that might arise in drafting workable legislation.104 
 
 In the 1990s and early 2000s, commentators, including Professors 
Spitko and Gallanis, drafted proposed statutory language extending the 
coverage of succession laws to unmarried, committed partners.105 In the 
midst of this flurry of reform proposals, Professor Mary Louise Fellows 
and a group of researchers undertook a small empirical study, published 
under the title Committed Partners and Inheritance, which began the work 
of determining which default rules the LGBT community and other 
committed unmarried couples would prefer.106 Professor Fellows and her 
team compared the results of this small study, which found that a majority 
would provide a share of the decedent’s estate to a surviving same-sex or 
                                                
100 Id. at 1099–1103. 
101 Id. at 1105–06. 
102 T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex 
Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1514–16 (1999). 
103 Id. at 1517–22. 
104 Id. at 1524–28. 
105 T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55 (2004); 
E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for 
Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255 (2002). In his article, Professor 
Spitko also included a copy of Professor Lawrence Waggoner’s proposal as an appendix. 
Spitko, supra, at  
106 Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 
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different-sex partner, with the then extant reforms and reform proposals. 
107 They also set forth throughout their paper areas that should be explored 
in future empirical research.108 
 
 Unfortunately, as the number of states legally recognizing same-
sex relationships has grown, it appears that interest in this topic has 
waned.109 This is a pity—and not only because (1) the majority of states 
still refuse to legally recognize same-sex relationships110 and (2) the UPC 
still does not directly take account of same-sex relationships.111 Even were 
all states to relieve the discrimination identified by Professors Spitko and 
Gallanis by legally recognizing same-sex relationships and to honor the 
preferences of those participating in Professor Fellows’s study, the laws 
governing intestate succession would still be ripe for reexamination. 
Eliminating de jure discrimination against same-sex couples by affording 
them access to marriage merely adds another group to a privileged circle. 
It does nothing to eliminate the broader privileges based on marital status 
and conformance to the “traditional” family norm of a conjugal couple 
surrounded by children. Thus, as currently drafted, the UPC continues not 
only to reflect but to further entrench the privileging of marriage, 
attempting to skew and direct choices regarding family formation rather 
than leaving it to the affected individuals to choose the family form that 
best suits them. 
 
 It is worth picking up this line of inquiry once again, but not 
merely to explore how to accommodate committed same-sex relationships 
in the states that continue to refuse them legal recognition. Instead, the 
focus should be on exploring how wills, trusts, and estates law might be 
reformed to break down this privileging and embrace the multiplicity of 
family forms that exist. In other words, how might the variety of default 
rules that exist be reformed to embrace diverse family structures, making 
it both easier and cheaper for these individuals to engage in estate 
                                                
107 Id. at 89, 94–95. 
108 Id. passim. 
109 Aside from the occasional student note on this topic. E.g., Madeleine N. Foltz, 
Comment, Needlessly Fighting an Uphill Battle: Extensive Estate Planning 
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110 Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (July 2, 2013), 
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planning while at the same time insulating them from collateral attack by 
disgruntled or disagreeable “traditional” family members?  
 
 Another interesting line of inquiry might focus on the lawyers who 
are providing estate planning advice. How does their own point of view 
influence the type of advice that they provide to LGBT clients and others 
in nontraditional family relationships? Put differently, do they 
unconsciously push nontraditional families toward conformance to 
traditional family norms? As Professor Amy Ronner observes in 
Homophobia: In the Closet and in the Coffin, it is not only estate planning 
attorneys that we should worry about but also the judges who hear cases 
involving decedents’ estates.112 In that article, Professor Ronner examines 
the heterosexism displayed by the judges in Vasquez v. Hawthorne.113 In 
Vasquez, the Washington courts considered whether judicial decisions 
affording some of the property rights associated with marriage to 
“meretricious” relationships (i.e., where a couple cohabits outside of 
marriage) should be extended to cover a surviving same-sex partner of a 
decedent who died intestate. In the course of her examination, Professor 
Ronner not only dissected the flaws in the court opinions but also 
discussed how the tone and content of the decisions create a legal 
atmosphere that encouraged same-sex couples to remain closeted—with 
all of the negative repercussions attendant to that societal construct.114  
 
 The question to explore with regard to both attorneys and judges is 
how their perspectives and preconceptions influence their representation 
of LGBT clients and the decisions that they make affecting LGBT 
individuals and their (chosen) family members. Once this question has 
been answered, it will be important to consider whether it is possible (and, 
if so, how) to train current and future estate planning attorneys and judges 
to be sensitive to the various and differing needs of clients in 
nontraditional family arrangements, so as to respect their autonomy and 
choices.  
 
 To educate elder law professionals, Professor Nancy Knauer has 
helpfully written about the unique experiences of the pre-Stonewall 
generation of LGBT elders.115 For example, in “Gen Silent”: Advocating 
for LGBT Elders, Professor Knauer not only described the unique 
experiences that have shaped the worldview of this generation of LGBT 
elders, but also how estate planning can be used to help protect them and 
                                                
112 Amy D. Ronner, Homophobia: In the Closet and in the Coffin, 21 LAW & INEQ. 65 
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2000). 
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improve their lives. In an ever-changing legal and social landscape, this 
work will need to be revisited and renewed as each post-Stonewall 
generations ages. As described above, it is important not only to educate 
elder law professionals (and judges) about their LGBT clients but also to 
educate them about themselves—identifying conscious and unconscious 
biases among these professionals that might influence the advice and 
assistance that they provide to LGBT elders. 
 
IV.  SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS 
 
 In view of the role that the law of wills, trusts, and estates plays in 
perpetuating the concentration of wealth and reifying the privilege of a 
wealthy few, one would expect that an examination of this area through 
the lens of socioeconomic class would be a natural starting point for 
critical analysis. Surprisingly, however, there is a paucity of work 
exploring the class-based aspects of the law of wills, trusts, and estates. 
 
 Among the work that does examine this area from a class-based 
perspective,  Professor Stephen Clowney’s In Their Own Hand: An 
Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking discusses the 
results of an empirical study of holographic wills undertaken in 
Pennsylvania.116 To test the conventional wisdom that holographic wills 
are open to fraud, invite litigation, and are fraught with errors, Professor 
Clowney reviewed all of the holographic wills filed in Allegheny County 
during two separate years. He showed that women disproportionately 
executed holographic wills, that the testators came from a variety of 
socioeconomic backgrounds, and that the holographic wills were no more 
likely to be challenged than formally executed wills.117 Many of the 
holographic wills did, however, contain drafting errors or lacunae.118 
Based on the results of his study, Professor Clowney argued that states 
should permit testators to draft holographic wills and should similarly 
reduce the formalities required to execute a will.119  
 
 Although this study was not aimed specifically at addressing issues 
of socioeconomic class, Professor Clowney did note the class-based 
implications of his study. By permitting testators to draft their own wills, 
he contended that states would reduce the financial obstacles that those 
with low income encounter when setting forth their intentions regarding 
how their property should be distributed at death.120 Because the 
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likelihood that a testator will not have a will is inversely related to the 
testator’s income level, permitting the probate of holographic wills would 
help to ensure that low-income testators pass their property as they 
intend—rather than having those intentions presumed by state intestacy 
laws.121 
 
 Professor Reid Weisbord took these proposals a step further in his 
article In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and 
Homemade Willmaking.122 In that article, Professor Weisbord put forth a 
new twist on old proposals to enhance the accessibility of testation 
through the creation of a statutory form will. His innovations included 
redrafting the residuary clause into plain English and moving it to the 
beginning of the form—as a designation of the primary beneficiaries of 
the will (i.e., those who will take all property for which a specific 
designation is not later made in the will).123 In addition, Professor 
Weisbord would make the form available as a schedule to the state income 
tax return, provide computer-aided drafting assistance, dispense with 
separate formalities of execution (employing instead the formalities that 
typically attend the electronic filing of income tax returns), and encourage 
the electronic filing of the will for storage by the state until the time of 
probate.124  
 
 Future research could, of course, continue exploring ways of 
reducing the obstacles that low- and middle-income testators encounter 
when attempting to create an estate plan. For instance, commentators 
could helpfully explore the ways in which the bar or the state might 
educate testators about the law of wills, trusts, and estates either to make 
them better consumers of legal services when they seek the aid of a lawyer 
or to reduce errors in the drafting of wills when they do not. But it would 
also be interesting to see commentators probe the role that the law of wills, 
trusts, and estates plays in reifying privilege—not to mention seeing them 
consider ways in which this area of law might be used to chip away at that 
privilege or to aid those who do not find themselves endowed with a great 
deal of property to actually accumulate some property that they might 
someday pass to their heirs.  
 
 It is usually at a different point of intersection that discussions of 
chipping away at the privilege of the wealthy occurs; namely, at the 
intersection of the law of wills, trusts, and estates with the tax system. 
Discussions of the redistributive potential of the estate tax seem to surface 
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when the country faces large deficits and needs to address the national 
debt. Some twenty years ago in his article Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 
Professor Mark Ascher proposed curtailing inheritance through changes to 
the estate and gift taxes, with the goal of increasing equality of 
opportunity and reducing the deficit.125 Aside from a reduced (but still 
generous) universal exemption, Professor Ascher would only permit 
limited transfers at death free of a confiscatory (i.e., 100%) estate tax; that 
is, he would permit tax-free transfers to those who helped to create the 
wealth (e.g., spouses), to those who depend upon the decedent for their 
care (e.g., dependent children, disabled descendants, and parents and 
grandparents of the decedent), and to charity.126 Professor Ascher also 
suggested correlative changes to the gift tax in keeping with his proposal 
and to backstop the revised estate tax regime.127 
 
 More recently, in Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to 
Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, Professors Paul Caron and 
James Repetti argued that decreasing the estate tax exemption and 
increasing the top estate tax rate would be a salutary means of reducing 
inequality in the United States.128 Professors Caron and Repetti 
summarized data on the increase in income and wealth inequality in the 
United States as well as studies on the role of the tax laws in reducing 
inequality.129 After considering the inconclusive data on the (in)efficiency 
of the estate tax, Professors Caron and Repetti argued that the estate tax is 
an efficient means to reducing inequality because “[t]here is a strong 
theoretical argument that the estate tax should have much less of an impact 
on savings than the income tax because of our psychological tendency to 
deny death and because the expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate 
is small during the period of life that taxpayers are creating wealth.”130 
 
 Given the benefits of earmarking tax revenue,131 an area that might 
fruitfully be explored is the idea of a negative inheritance tax. In other 
words, scholars might explore the possibility of tying direct or tax 
expenditure programs that aim to redress socioeconomic (or even other 
forms of) inequality to the revenue raised by the estate tax, in lieu of 
advocating an increase in the estate tax as an efficient way to raise revenue 
for general spending or deficit reduction. Such proposals might not only 
                                                
125 Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990). 
126 Id. at 121–36. 
127 Id. at 137–50. 
128 Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to 
Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013). 
129 Id. at 1257–80. 
130 Id. at 1288; see id. at 1280–88 (discussing the data). 
131 See generally Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 
55 (2006). 
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make the estate tax more palatable, but also might make programs 
designed to reduce inequality themselves more palatable and politically 
understandable to the population at large 
 
V. DISABILITY 
 
 Issues relating to disability arise in many areas of the law of wills, 
trusts, and estates. Focusing on special needs trusts in his article 
Supplemental Needs Trust for People with Disabilities: The Development 
of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, Professor Joseph Rosenberg 
traced the origins of trusts to their use as a vehicle to avoid rigidity in 
English law and to alleviate the economic hardship of those who might 
otherwise be disadvantaged under the law.132 Professor Rosenberg then 
described the evolution of the special needs trust, which is a trust designed 
to simultaneously avoid the beneficiary’s disqualification from 
government assistance and allow monies to be spent to enhance the quality 
of life of the disabled beneficiary by defraying expenses not covered by 
government assistance.133 Furthermore, Professor Rosenberg emphasized 
how, as sanctioned by Congress, a pooled special needs trust takes the rare 
step of “redistribut[ing] wealth away from the government and toward 
nonprofit groups that serve indigent individuals with severe 
disabilities.”134  
 
 Given the benefits of special needs trusts and the protections 
Congress intended to afford them, Professor Rosenberg critiqued a line of 
cases concerning the priority of Medicaid liens. According to Professor 
Rosenberg, this line of cases violates the intent of Congress in carving 
special needs trusts out of the resources that are taken into account in 
determining eligibility for Medicaid by allowing states to seize money 
judgments rendered against tortfeasors who caused the individual to seek 
government assistance in the first place.135 Professor Rosenberg put forth a 
number of proposals for improving these congressionally authorized 
special needs trusts, including a proposal to defer enforcing Medicaid liens 
until the death of the beneficiary of the special needs trust.136 Given that 
special needs trusts can “create opportunities for independent living, 
innovative rehabilitation and therapy, employment, and other activities 
that give life meaning,” Professor Rosenberg concluded by asserting that 
                                                
132 Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trust for People with Disabilities: The 
Development of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 99–103 
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“[t]he concept of the supplemental needs trust should be strengthened, 
replicated, and expanded.”137 
 
 While Professor Rosenberg focuses on the ability of the law of 
trusts to enhance the quality of life of disabled individuals, there is a 
shadow lurking behind this positive story that bears consideration: the role 
of paternalism in representing or dealing with disabled individuals.138 
Consideration should be given to the agency costs of using a trust as the 
vehicle for enhancing a disabled individual’s quality of life. By necessity, 
the use of a trust places funds in the hands of someone other than the 
disabled individual to enhance the disabled individual’s quality of life—as 
the trustee deems appropriate. This strips the disabled individual of the 
ability to freely make choices for herself regarding what spending will 
enhance her quality of life. Some thought should be given to developing 
reform proposals that restore this agency and both hear and respect the 
wishes of the individual whose life society is purporting to improve 
through the creation and sanctioning of special needs trusts. 
 
 As part of a faculty day presentation at New York Law School, 
Professor Pamela Champine penned an essay titled A Sanist Will?, in 
which she brought “the theoretical construct of sanism from the areas of 
civil commitment and criminal law, in which it was developed, to the law 
of wills.”139 Professor Champine suggested that sanism—the “irrational 
prejudice against or judgment about persons with mental disabilities”—is 
a potential explanation for the discrimination in the application of the 
doctrine of testamentary capacity against those who make dispositions of 
property that fail to conform to societal expectations.140 After searching 
for signs of sanism in the policy underlying the doctrine of testamentary 
capacity and in the case law applying it,141 Professor Champine discussed 
 
several beneficial corollaries to the reduction of sanism, 
including reduction of discrimination in testamentary 
validity based upon failure to comport with societal norms; 
renewed focus on the extent to which family protection is 
desired and desirable; potential enhancement of therapeutic 
consequences for testators and those involved in will 
contests; and integration of ethical concerns faced by estate 
planning lawyers who serve clients of questionable 
capacity into the law of testamentary capacity.142 
                                                
137 Id. at 151. 
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 Responding to Professor Champine’s work, two students made 
contributions to faculty day on the topic of sanism in the law of wills, 
trusts, and estates. In keeping with Professor Champine’s contribution, 
Heather Ellis argued in favor of “raising the bar to a stricter standard of 
scrutinizing the mental capacity of the aged or disabled.”143 Ms. Ellis 
urged probing the operation of the test for testamentary capacity in 
practice, with the aim of ensuring that it does not mask illness or 
incorrectly label someone as lacking testamentary capacity.144 In 
particular, Ms. Ellis drew attention to the intersection of sanism and 
paternalism with socioeconomic class. Ms. Ellis noted that 
 
[s]omeone of high social status with greater economic 
resources has a much better chance of probating a will even 
though the will has eccentricities or leaves out close 
relatives. Sanism in how we view people’s economic status 
in society will draw a fine line between being eccentric and 
being mentally ill or incompetent.145 
 
Those with wealth and power are, from a sanist perspective, both less 
likely to be perceived as mentally ill or incompetent and are more likely to 
have the means to defend against allegations of incapacity.146 
 
 Claire Steinberger examined and summarized Professor 
Champine’s work, underscoring the possibility that the probate process 
and determinations of testamentary capacity might simultaneously be 
skewed by and reify cultural norms.147 This is an area worthy of further 
exploration, as it sits at the intersection of disability with gender, race, 
class, gender identity/expression, and sexual orientation. Individuals in all 
of these groups may be the victim of hidden (or not so hidden) biases that 
are used to force behavior to conform to majoritarian expectations. A 
holistic view that brings together all of these different perspectives might 
help to formulate better, more comprehensive proposals that combat these 
biases, increase the respect for the individual in a pluralistic society, and 
have a greater likelihood of adoption. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Disposing of one’s property during lifetime and at death is an 
individual and private matter.  The structure of the law of wills, trusts and 
estates is designed to safeguard and effectuate decisions made by 
individuals.  But inheritance is not only a private matter. It is “a public 
event with symbolic messages about normative property distribution, 
individual freedom, and familial or other collective obligations.”148  These 
symbolic messages cannot be ignored.  Scholars need to continuously 
engage with them, along with the structure and mechanisms of the law that 
underpin those symbolic messages.  Law not only effectuates individual 
intent regarding the disposition of property, but also functions as structure 
itself that must be evaluated for bias.   
 
 The law in action needs to fulfill its aspirational commitments. 
This is as much true for “money law” as it is for other areas—and perhaps 
more so. Without the ability to accumulate wealth and pass it from 
generation to generation, historically disempowered groups may find 
themselves trapped as the avenues for advancement—what some might 
call the American promise of a better life for each “next” generation—are 
closed off from them. Cutting off any group from this societal aspiration 
affects us all, because it inhibits the flourishing of our society. In this way, 
how well any area of law safeguards the historically disadvantaged is a 
measure of equality and justice for all people 
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